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Abstract 
 
In this contribution, the author first considers the characteristics of the Czechoslovak communist 
welfare state and its theoretical alternatives. Throughout the reform process, dependency on both 
corporatist and socialist regimes won out, while residualist efforts were promoted in the 
beginning, but were later held back. The author then considers the possible actors involved in 
social reforms. In this respect, when proceeding from a general to a more concrete level, thought 
should first be devoted to the social classes and their ideologies, and second to political parties 
and their leaders. The author goes on to summarise the particular problems and traps in 
individual sections of the Czech social system. While no objection to decent standards of social 
protection and health care could be raised, the poor efficiency of their achievement should evoke 
concern. The author concludes by reflecting on the possible specificities of Czech social reform 
in comparison with the other countries undergoing reform and the EU. The current lethargy of 
the Czech welfare system corresponds to a “frozen edifice”, just as in most Western countries. 
However, such stagnation is apparently acceptable to both the politicians (who mask it in 
reformist rhetoric) and the population (which learned to master taking advantage of the generous 
welfare state) and thus is basically sustainable in the long run.   
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Motto: 
In a modern Czech fairy tale, the girl who wanted to marry the Prince, should arrive by driving/not 
driving, should be dressed/not dressed, and should bring a gift/non-gift. The winner thus came driving a 
scooter, dressed in a net and bringing a sparrow in a box (Jan Werich: On the Queen Scooter I). 
 
 
Introduction  
 
In the period immediately after 1989, there was no explicit idea as to the interplay between the 
economic and social spheres in the Czech Republic. The list of urgent questions – among them, 
introducing democratic legislation, launching privatisation and market liberalisation – did not 
include social policy. An additional reason for this was that social problems were not as acute in 
former Czechoslovakia as they were in other Central-East European (CEE) countries. However, 
no one ever questioned the importance of the social dimension of the transformation. The 
population ranked it second only to personal security. But the social democratic tradition of pre-
war Czechoslovakia and the proximity of “Social Europe” were assumed sufficient to prevent 
unrestrained capitalism from surfacing. 
 
The upcoming change of policies was not backed by any theoretical debate. This was impeded 
by several factors. After swimming in Marxist-Leninist clichés for years, academics lacked the 
appropriate conceptual frameworks. Furthermore, any thorough discussion of social policy was 
suspiciously socialist in its connotation.
1 Thus, the institutional change and “political economy” 
of social transformation was researched by foreign rather than local students.
2 Only the effects of 
social protection and state redistribution on social inequality and public perceptions of the reform 
were studied (Vecernik, 1993 and 1996). A more intensive study of social policy came much 
later, but remained largely descriptive (e.g. Potucek, 1999; Sirovatka, 2000). 
 
                                                           
1 As Johan De Deken (1992, 21) clearly pointed out: “The Leninist regime effectively discredited anything that 
makes even the most moderate allusion to socialism”. Similarly, Zsuzsa Ferge (1994) showed that, because of the 
past, social policy is the weakest aspect of socialist party activity in Hungary. 
2 Here special emphasis should be put on the pioneering historical work of Johan De Deken (1995) and Mitchell 
Orenstein and his colleagues (Cook, Orenstein and Rueschemeyer, 1999), and also the work of Ulrike Götting 
(1998) and Katharina Müller (1999), which are more focused on the post-1989 transition in the social area. A great 
effort in describing the systemic change was made by the editors Nelson, Tilly and Walker (1997) and Elster, Offe 
and Preuss (1998).  3 
However, it is not the lack of academic debate but rather the lack of social actors that really 
matters. The formation of actors and their explicit agendas is a slow process. Under communism, 
social homogeneity and political unanimity were declared, but behind the scenes society was 
parochialised and peoples’ interests atomised. Social policy itself was considered more a 
technical and financial matter rather than one of political decision-making. After 1989, 
previously repressed interests appeared and new ones gradually emerged. In the new 
circumstances, all the potential actors bore some piece of the legacy of the communist past, 
whether as a burden (like the trade unions, considered the direct descendents of the “red” unions 
that served as leverage in the Communist Party), or as a way of thinking (like “liberal” 
economists, embracing neoclassical economics as a cookbook, similarly to the way in which the 
Marxist political economy had been treated before). 
 
Emergency measures and missing strategies at the beginning of the transformation were replaced 
by more systemic policies in the mid-1990s. The main action was imposed from above, by the 
will of individual politicians, rather than generated from below by a variety of interests. With 
regard to the general framework, much confusion could be observed between the drive towards a 
“market-without-adjectives” model, corresponding to Anglo-Saxon-type capitalism, and the 
European social system, which could be characterised by political consensus, economic 
cooperation and mediating institutions, all of them aiming to achieve social inclusion (Aust, 
Leitner and Lessenich, 2000).  
 
In aiming to examine the Czech social reform “in general”, we must bear in mind several 
limitations. The main problem is that it is difficult to perceive the driving forces behind a 
historical process immediately and from the inside. Such an analysis requires a time lapse in 
order to collect the critical mass of information and to recognize the (originally blurred) interest 
structure behind it. A conceptual framework of observation is also needed - so far this has been 
transferred from the West rather than developed in the transition countries themselves. In each 
step, one must be aware of the mismatch between political rhetoric and real acts.  
 
In this contribution, first the characteristics of the Czechoslovak communist welfare state and its 
theoretical alternatives are considered. Second, an outline is made of the phasing of social 4 
 
 
reforms, tracing their main steps and the backgrounds to them. Third, a summary is made of the 
particular problems and traps of individual sections of the Czech social system. Finally, the paper 
concludes with reflections on the possible specificities of Czech social reform in comparison 
with other countries undergoing reform and the EU.  
 
 
1. From communist paternalism to where? 
 
The social policy of post-1948 Czechoslovakia had two different faces. In accordance with 
communist ideology, it proclaimed itself to be universal, protective and generous. When the 
Constitution of 1960 pronounced Czechoslovakia a “socialist” state, almost everybody had the 
right to free health care and universal pension benefits and family allowances. Of course, these 
were all related to employment status, and thus they exclusively encompassed members of the 
working class and the “socialist intelligentsia” and, later, also members of the class of 
cooperative farmers. In agreement with communist ideology, Czechoslovakia was indeed a state 
without real unemployment, and without any visibly wide social disparities or extreme poverty. 
 
We should not lose sight of the road that led to such a state of affairs. A comprehensive social 
protection system covering the majority of the non-farming population had already been built in 
pre-war Czechoslovakia.
3 Before the communist putsch in 1948, two-thirds of the working-age 
population had old-age security and illness insurance. After the communists seized power, the 
assets of all existing insurance funds were confiscated by the state. The state also confiscated 
private firms, houses, savings and assets that were intended to cover old-age provisions for the 
self-employed, entrepreneurs and farmers. Despite the impoverishment of the people in this way, 
the state took little responsibility for the protection of these “bourgeois elements”, granting them 
pensions at levels far below any imaginable subsistence minimum.  
 
Therefore, not only the social protection of the entire population and the income support of 
families with children, but also class war and communist ideology were built into the allegedly 
universal and generous social protection system. Not only did the state assist people, it also 
                                                           
3 For instance, the two pillars of pre-war Czechoslovak old-age security were the White-Collar Employees’ Pension 
Act, in effect since 1906, and the Manual Workers’ Social Insurance Act, in effect since 1924. 5 
deprived them in advance of all their personal and family resources for surviving in their old age. 
However, the individual measures in the social field had more than just the explicit repressive 
functions against the selected social categories of “class enemy”. In particular they had implicit 
controlling functions affecting the entire population. The pension scheme and family benefits 
were not just the tools of social protection for citizens; they also served as a tool for life-long 
totalitarian control over them.  
 
Totalitarian control over the populace is an important explanatory key to the social policy under 
the communist system and to the universality of social generosity. Work was not just a right but 
also primarily a duty. Though the term “insurance” was formally kept, all social provisions were 
derived from a person’s status as a state employee. Consequently, the administration of 
employment served as a tool of domination over the citizens in their work and family life. People 
displaying insufficient loyalty to the regime were sentenced by the Communist Party to perform 
the least desirable jobs and thus eventually received the lowest pension benefits.
4 The total 
opacity of social and pension benefit financing served as a manifestation of the claim that the 
state bestowed generous gifts upon its citizens, from the paternalistic point of view of the 
“beneficent ruler”.  
 
However, the system was not necessarily interpreted as a mechanism of control. People also 
perceived it as a continuation of social democratic traditions, an extension of pre-war social 
policy and an expression of the intrinsic “classlessness” of Czech society. Not only in the 
broadly promulgated ideology (which advertised full coverage of the population with 
employment and related benefits as one of its main social advantages), but also in reality, state 
paternalism was beneficial to a huge part of the population. The sections that were first to gain 
from the new system were the original supporters of the Communist Party, primarily the lower 
strata of the working class. During the long period of communist rule, the other parts of the 
population also came to accept and learned how to ease their lives under paternalistic state care. 
 
                                                           
4 Unfortunately, no serious attempt was in fact made after 1989 to upgrade low pension benefits of the former 
“enemies of the regime”, despite the evident unjustness in their continuity.  6 
 
 
Of course the paternalistic expectations the population had become accustomed to continued 
after 1989. Moreover, the “road back to Europe” was associated with the view of a generally 
higher standard of living, expected to arrive soon, and a willingness to “tighten one’s belt” was 
perceived rather as a declaration. The old social protection system was maintained with only 
slight modifications, and it was merely rephrased in the new and rather confusing “safety-net” 
vocabulary. Recommendations from the World Bank and other international experts were 
confined to the technical level of providing efficient tools for income maintenance and 
employment promotion services. In the comprehensive World Bank publication, all general 
terms such as the “welfare state” or “social regime” were avoided (Barr, 1994). 
 
Theoretically speaking, in accordance with Gösta Esping-Andersen’s (1990) well-known 
typology, one of three possible variants of the welfare state could have been implemented: 1) 
The universalist or social-democratic type, which closely resembles the socialist type in that 
people are treated first and foremost as workers and the state is assigned the responsibility of 
ensuring full employment. Here the state comes to the fore as the “employer of the first resort”; 
2) The institutional or corporatist welfare state in which social security serves the maintenance 
and reproduction of status and income differences. The state is not so much concerned with 
employment as with the family, and arrives on the scene as the “compensator of the first resort”; 
3) The liberal or residual welfare regime, in which the state relies mostly upon the market and 
acts as the “compensator of the last resort”.  
 
Actual national systems are, however, more complex than any generalised typology, because 
they usually combine elements of various regimes and differ in individual fields (pension, family 
support, poverty alleviation, health care). It is difficult to imagine that it would be possible to 
establish a welfare system by design, according to a blueprint or a theoretical concept. Even 
during the “revolutionary” phase of transformation, national systems were shaped by historical 
traditions, path dependent on established institutions, burdened by people’s expectations and 
constrained by financial resources. The institutional “path dependence” (Stark, 1992) is 
especially strong in the pension system, as the liabilities that were already established should be 
met.  
 7 
In terms of the choice of alternatives, Czech society was likely at a certain crossroads at the 
outset of reform. Liberal ideas and the “market-without-adjectives” concept of governmental 
economists, under the charismatic leadership of Vaclav Klaus, pushed the liberal welfare state 
forward, taking the UK as a model. In the view of the population, a social-democratic and largely 
redistributive, Scandinavian-type of welfare state looked to be the best option, as it maintained 
the “good side” of what emerged under the communist regime. Traditionally, however, Czech 
society belongs to the type of corporatist welfare states arising out of Bismarckian Germany. 
This model was developed in the pre-war Czechoslovak Republic, where the social democratic 
governments nurtured a relatively generous social policy. Throughout the reform process, 
dependency on both corporatist and socialist regimes won out, while residualist efforts were 
promoted in the beginning, but were later held back. 
 
 
2. Reforms searching for their players 
 
Once the economic system began to change, several emergency social measures were introduced. 
The first phase occurred under the rule of the socio-liberal Civic Forum (until mid-1992) and 
was marked by the continuity of former benefits and quite generous arrangements. M. Castle-
Kanerova (1992:115) commented on this aptly: “The current situation is such that social policy 
remains, despite the arguments to the contrary, a system of paternalistic and patriarchal 
proposals”. When the mid-1992 elections shifted the political leadership to the “liberal” Civic 
Democratic Party (ODS) headed by Vaclav Klaus, the second phase began, in which a move 
away from the paternalistic state towards the responsibility of individuals was declared. Under 
the common umbrella of a less expensive and more efficient welfare regime, a far-reaching 
reform process was announced in the following directions:  
 
1) With regard to state pensions, a weakening of the earnings-relation and the encouragement of 
people to join private pension schemes; 2) With regard to child and other family-related benefits, 
the introduction of an income test and/or the introduction of a ceiling on benefits; 3) With regard 
to social assistance, the introduction of better targeting through strict means-testing; 4) With 
regard to the health care system, a strengthening of the insurance principle and individual 8 
 
 
responsibility; 5) And in general, deriving social security from citizenship rights alone by 
preventing employers and professional associations from sharing social guarantees.  
 
The transformation of the social protection system was developed in three separate fields. Social 
insurance was designed to accommodate predictable situations such as unemployment, illness 
and old age. State social support was newly established to set various benefits aimed at 
addressing the situation of financial need associated with maternity, child rearing and disability. 
Social assistance was intended to address individual situations of material need and was to be 
administered by local authorities. Although much effort was invested especially in tightening 
pension entitlements and residualising the transfer income, path dependency and adverse 
political forces (even inside of the coalition) managed to dilute the process to a considerable 
degree. 
 
Since the process of implementing the main steps was completed around the mid-1990s, not 
much has been going on in the social sphere. However, there continues to be an exchange of 
opinions between those who demand that a second fully-funded pillar of pension insurance be 
established and those who want more state redistribution within the PAYG system; between 
those who want to reduce and target more family allowances and those who want to restore them 
as a universal benefit and even increase them (arguing the decline in fertility); between those 
who ask to set minimum standards of health care and require patients’ extra payments and those 
who want to keep care without limits, etc. Serving as arenas for this discussion are Parliament, 
the Tripartite Commission and the media, but there is also a good deal of activity going on 
behind the scenes in governmental and other lobbies.  
 
In referring to a debate that actually serves to conceal the lack of action, can we really speak here 
about social actors steering the process at all? And if so, what might their identities and profiles 
be like?  
 
There are several approaches to classifying social-policy actors in the transformation process. 
One can certainly distinguish between individual and collective actors, institutional and socio-
structural players (like class and social groups or strata), domestic, foreign and international 9 
interest bearers, and, as the case may be, even between manifest and hidden actors. In his 
systematic analysis of pension reform in Hungary, Poland and Kazakhstan, Mitchell Orenstein 
(2000) follows George Tsebelis (1995) in distinguishing “proposal actors” and “veto actors”, and 
interest groups and deliberative forums. Katharina Müller, in her remarkable study comparing 
the Hungarian and Polish reforms with the Czech non-reform, distinguishes “primary actors”, 
which are the Ministry of Welfare, the Ministry of Finance and the World Bank, and “secondary 
actors”, like political parties, trade unions and pensioners’ associations (Müller, 1999). 
 
When proceeding from the general to a more concrete level, thought should first be devoted to 
social classes and their ideologies, and second to political parties and their leaders. After 1989, 
with the exception of the remaining loyal Communists, and outside of the Christian Democrats, 
people rejected any class or party ideology. Later on, opinions seemed to become structured 
again. In the late 1990s, only a quarter of respondents continued to reject any ideology, and of 
the remainder, 35 percent adhered to socialism and 40 percent to liberalism/conservatism. Within 
this latter amalgam, a declining (but still majority) share has come to opt for a traditional, family-
oriented Christian doctrine, while an increasing number ascribe to the modern, market-oriented 
system.  
 
Instead of occupation-based social classes a vertical hierarchy is increasingly being applied by 
academics and is spreading in public opinion. Following Peter L. Berger’s (1986) assumptions, 
the crux of the matter is the role of the middle class in advanced societies. The issue is cast in 
terms of middle-class hegemony or middle-class consensus (Vecernik, 1999; Easterly, 2000). In 
the first period of the Czech transformation, the middle-class agenda was referred to rather 
negatively, following the liberal interpretation of redistribution from lower to higher income 
groups through educational and other services (Goodin and Le Grand, 1987). Since the mid-
1990s, positive attitudes have prevailed, implicitly following the argument that in social reform 
“the middle class matters” (Andries, 1996).  
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Table 1 Economic and social opinions of economically active people by social class (%) 
 
 
Opinion  
Old 
middle 
class 
New 
middle 
class 
Routine 
non-
manual 
Ma-
nual 
wor-
kers 
Total 
Economic reform:          
Satisfied with the progress of reform  51.9  40.2  37.7  25.4  73.8 
State should control the economy  60.9  76.2  81.6  89.7  81.0 
Career perspective:          
Occupation has a good outlook  92.5  74.1  77.5  65.7  73.8 
Skills are more useful than before  75.5  57.8  57.2  37.4  51.3 
Social justice:          
Everybody is responsible for his poverty  54.2  38.4  29.8  25.3  33.1 
People get rich in an unfair way  56.8  73.0  83.2  89.5  80.0 
State paternalism:          
State should provide jobs  66.2  66.3  75.9  83.4  76.0 
State should provide apartments  47.3  57.3  64.4   72.4  64.0 
State should control prices  38.6  49.1  55.6  71.2  58.8 
Preferred economic system:          
Socialist, like before 1989  1.5   3.7  2.1  11.1  6.3 
Social-market   37.1  62.2  68.1  68.0  62.3 
Liberal market  61.4  34.1  29.8  20.9  31.4 
Pension benefits:         
Revenue financed  24.1  30.7  33.2  47.6  37.7 
Financed from pension funds  58.6  58.9  56.8  47.6  53.4 
Financed from private insurance  17.3  10.4  10.0   4.9  8.9 
Family allowances:         
Universal 37.6  47.6  56.3  58.1  52.6 
Means-tested 52.6  43.9  36.3  38.3  41.1 
No state benefits    9.8   8.5   7.4   7.4  6.3 
State health care:         
Without limits  30.8  45.1  49.7  60.5  50.8 
Certain limits  61.7  48.2  45.5  37.2  44.8 
Only minimal care   7.5   6.7   4.7   2.3  4.4 
Source: Economic Expectations and Attitudes, 1998. 
 
As Table 1 shows, opinion data reveal considerable differences among the classes: whereas the 
inclination towards a liberal regime is overwhelming among the entrepreneurial middle classes, 
it is declared by only one-fifth of manual workers. The preference for “liberal” solutions in the 
pension system, child benefits and health care systematically declines as we proceed from the 
middle to the lower classes. It is not only the differentiation of attitudes but also and especially 
their dynamism that matters. The middle classes are following the general trend of diminishing 11 
liberal attitudes towards individual responsibility, but are doing so more slowly than other social 
groups. Moreover, the “old” middle class is doing so more slowly than the “new” middle class. 
While the self-employed still retain a considerable part of their enthusiasm for reform, 
professionals and public servants are less content (Vecernik and Mateju eds., 1999). 
  
While the arena of social classes is rather implicit and hidden (and thus can be easily challenged 
or even denied), political parties represent explicit collective actors. Moving along the 
hypothetical right-left axis, the following are the main parties in the Czech Republic: Civic 
Democratic Party,  the declared conservative stream, and specifically the residual model 
(following the model of the New Right); Christian Democrats, adhering to the so-called social-
market doctrine, which “combines market economy and social solidarity” (following the 
example of Germany and Austria); Social Democrats, who are seeking to maintain a universal 
system and make the benefits more generous, still using compulsory insurance principles and not 
overlooking the earnings relation (with the Scandinavian model as best); Communists, intent on a 
return to the generous and equalised, universal state system (aiming at “true” socialism, not 
identical to that of the pre-1990 regime).  
 
However, it is not just current party ideologies but also historical roots that matter. While civic 
parties have no predecessors,
 5  the centrist and leftist parties are directly or indirectly path 
dependent. However much under constraint, the Christian Democrats managed to survive 
through the communist period as a part of the National Front, which was established as a bundle 
of “progressive parties” in 1945. Although the Social Democratic Party was forcefully united 
with the Communists in 1948 and ceased to exist independently for 50 years, it can still refer 
back to its long history and strong position in pre-war Czechoslovakia. The Communists have not 
changed their social doctrine at all, and only restored their pre-war anti-capitalist vocabulary. 
Moreover, despite the immense decline experienced after 1989, they continue to have the largest 
membership base, followed by the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats. In contrast, 
civic parties are rather “election” parties, with a small membership base.  
 
                                                           
5 In fact, the civic parties were quite weak in pre-war Czechoslovakia. In comparison with the Agrarian Party, the 
Social Democrats and the National Socialists, parties such as the National Democrats and the Czechoslovak Middle-
Class Party managed to draw very few members and votes.  12 
 
 
There is a certain mismatch between the levels of social reform. While on the general level of 
“big reform” the Civic Democrats act as a “proposal actor”, submitting advice throughout the 
process of reorganising taxes and benefits (flat tax and social benefits), and the Social Democrats 
behave as “veto actors”, on the concrete level of “small reform” the situation is reversed: the 
Social Democrats propose a variety of minor economic measures and more control over 
spending, while the Civic Democrats try to block their efforts, citing as arguments the marginal 
and short-term character of the measures which even further strengthen the burden of employers. 
While “big reform” remains unelaborated, the “small reform” package of laws was passed by 
Parliament in 2003.  
 
 
3. Actors dividing their claims  
 
Instead of energetic change, much of the former network and institutional structure was 
maintained in Czech society. Behind the facade of a liberal policy, actors strong previously were 
supported (like big companies and semi-state banks) to the detriment of new firms and equal 
chances for citizens. Paternalistic employment (“labour hoarding” in large firms), rent regulation 
(favouring citizens who had obtained a state apartment under communism), and generous social 
benefits nourished the expectations of continuing state protection. The welfare system retained a 
high degree of redistribution, directed both downward and upward from the middle of the social 
hierarchy (Vecernik, 1999). While no objection to decent standards of social protection and 
health care could be raised, the low efficiency of their achievement should evoke concerns.  
 
Here, an attempt will be made to create a basic picture of the three individual fields – the pension 
system, social protection and health care – by sketching them in their rough contours. 
 
The transformation of the pension system was not induced primarily by the change in regime, 
which was the case with health care and the social protection system. Indeed, no explicit 
requirements were formulated with regard to the fundamental change that occurred in the status 
formation of retired people, i.e. from a dependent and socially needy category (as it was formed 
and fixed under the communist regime) to the “emeritus” status of former insurance payers, 13 
investors and savers (corresponding to the situation in advanced Western countries). Quite the 
opposite was true, as the pressure on redistribution that is already built into the PAYG system is 
further reinforced by the two trends that Czech society shares with the advanced world: a 
decreasing fertility rate and increasing life expectancy.  
 
In spite of the gloomy demographic outlook there has been little movement on the pension scene. 
The Social Democrats (CSSD) has proposed the introduction of notional pension accounts and 
establishing occupational pensions. ODS maintains their strong demands for radical pension 
reform, which would combine a solidary-type basic pension with an individual insurance 
scheme. At the same time, it seems that financial groups have toned down the lobbying activity 
they once pursued in favour of mandatory private insurance and are now relying on an increase 
in voluntary savings. All that is certain today is that the retirement age will increase to 63 for 
both men and women (and later maybe even to 65) and that the state will continue the effort to 
reduce pension entitlements and bring some more resources into the PAYG system (Reform of 
Public Finance, 2003).  
 
Parametrical changes in the pension system, which are the only changes under serious 
preparation, will do little to contribute to the socio-economic emancipation of pensioners. What 
remains is the exclusive dependence of pensioners on the current contributions and on their 
submission to the discretion of the state in setting the ratio of average wage and pension benefits. 
A large number of people save privately for retirement, but due to the low level of average 
contributions these savings represent no substantial increase to the financial resources of old-age 
security. Active earners and pensioners thus remain connected vessels, and a latent social 
conflict between the two could develop and gain strength. This situation could worsen even 
further if the relationship were to be simplified in the public opinion into an imaginary trade-off 
between the situation of pensioners and children.  
 
A systemic change in social benefits was quite well prepared under the explicit principle of 
targeting, but the results can be considered barely satisfactory. On the one hand, the system often 
fails to target, and there is a significant degree of non-take-up of benefits. On the other hand, 
income and means-testing are insufficient measures, and the misuse of benefits is commonplace. 14 
 
 
Many recipients of benefits have developed manipulative behaviour for exploiting the system. 
The main problem is that various kinds of benefits are paralleled and the system has several and 
not well coordinated accesses: labour offices for unemployment benefits, district state 
administration for benefits from the state support scheme, and local social care divisions for 
social assistance benefits. Thus a shift of the social benefits agenda to the labour offices has been 
envisaged.  
 
In fact, the new social benefit scheme was applied from above as an “expert” system. It was 
therefore overburdened with assumptions, most of which were copied out of textbooks on 
mainstream economics. For instance, it was assumed that there is no such thing as a trade-off 
between the compulsion toward labour market participation and benefit dependence; no market 
failures leading to mass redundancies of workers in micro-regions offering little other choice of 
jobs; no state administration failures to provide and withdraw benefits, which would eventually 
lead to the unwarranted granting of benefits and the acquisition of tactics for their systematic 
misuse; no clever individuals fostering their “second best” coping strategies, which combine the 
tax-free informal economy with use of the full-range of state benefits.  
 
Inconsistency in the level of various benefits makes the system inefficient. While unemployment 
benefits are strict, welfare benefits in the Czech Republic compensate as much as in the most 
generous European countries. The distance between the low and stagnating wages for lower 
categories of workers on the one hand and the relatively generous (especially for large families) 
and regularly valorised subsistence minimum on the other hand creates a relatively inviting 
poverty trap. Such a state of affairs is mainly advantageous to the Roma families, where there is 
usually a large number of children. Furthermore, the trap is similarly attractive to rural 
households, where living costs are low due to considerable income in kind, while expenditures 
connected with employment are high due to high transportation costs.  
 
Though inefficiently, the system basically manages to alleviate poverty. This task has been 
alleviated by the fact that the Czech labour market did not leave too many people in the welfare 
system. Until the mid-1990s, poverty was connected with the life cycle of the family and 
affected households with a large number of children and elderly living alone. Since 1997, 15 
unemployment has risen significantly and produced a “new poverty” connected with labour 
market failures.
6 However, the percentage of families living below the official subsistence 
minimum is still only 3.5 percent on average, but it is 25 percent among the unemployed 
(statistical survey Social Situation of Households, 2001). As Table 2 shows, if measured by the 
EU poverty line (60 percent of the median income per equivalent unit), the percentage of poor in 
the Czech Republic is 8 percent, as opposed to 15 percent in the EU15.  
 
Table 2 Poverty risk in the Czech Republic and the European Union in 2000 (%) 
 
Czech Republic  EU-15   
Men Women Total  Men Women Total 
Total     8    15 
By age cohort:         
0-15     12    19 
16-24  19 21 20 10 10 10 
25-49  7 8 7  12  14  13 
50-64  4 5 4  12  13  12 
65-  3 8 6  15  19  17 
By employment status:        
Employees    3 3 3 8 6 7 
Self-employed  6 2 5  16  14  15 
Unemployed  30 31 31 44 33 39 
Pensioners  3 7 5  15  16  15 
Other  inactive  11 12 11 24 24 24 
Source: Joint Memorandum on Social Inclusion, 2003. 
Percentage of persons with net income below 60% median income per equivalent unit. 
 
In reaction to the over-centralisation and over-planning of health care under the communist 
regime, a far-reaching process of separation and marketisation was initiated at the very beginning 
of the transformation. A kind of a chaotic transformation ensued, illustrated by the rapid 
alternation of ministers of health. Strong actors appeared on the scene – medical associations, 
health insurance funds, and manufacturers of medical technology and pharmaceutical products. 
Policy devices, especially privatisation, substituted policy aims. After establishing the general 
principles early in 1990, hardly any of the conceptual documents introduced by any of the health 
ministers managed to attain government approval. The entire process of acquiring health 
legislation in the Czech Republic has been turbulent and ineffective.  
                                                           
6 At the end of 2002, one-half of the unemployed were already long-term unemployed (i.e. had been seeking a job 
for more than 12 months) as opposed to less than one-third in 1995 (Labor Force Surveys).  16 
 
 
 
Much unbalance remains within the health sector. While many private clinics prosper well and 
the majority of private physicians can more or less easily survive, most hospitals have a deficit. 
Two different worlds interface here: on the one hand, there are the private suppliers of 
pharmaceutical technology and products, who have a good deal of control over price setting and 
possess strong lobbying and corruptive power; on the other hand, there are the private physicians 
and hospitals, constrained by fee-for-service tariffs and other strict rules set by health insurance 
companies and the state. There is no clear boundary between the two, owing to the numerous 
personal links and the common interests in strengthening the flow of cash into the health sector. 
In spite of all the rhetoric about the need to economise, there is no real interest in changing this 
deficient and not transparent system.  
 
Evidently, there has been very little coordination between the three sectors overviewed here – the 
pension system, social benefits and health care. Nothing like a Social Committee – a parallel to 
the governmental Economic Council, which functioned in the first years of transition – was 
established in the Czech Republic, despite a 1990 proposal to create this kind of coordination 
centre for social reform. Besides the declaration of general principles (whether derived from 
“socialist” continental Europe or the “liberal” UK and USA) there was almost no common 
structure implemented across sectors. Also, in the timing of the individual reform steps it is 
possible to find just one turning point in the mid-1990s, when the main action in the pension and 
benefit system of the Klaus’ government peaked.  
 
The obvious rationale behind such development is the lack and/or the diversity of actors. While 
the health care sector had an abundance of “small” actors, coming mostly from below, the other 
two sectors (pension and social benefits) were rather left to the discretion of the state and were 
eventually frozen by the compromises made between the “big” political parties. As it turned out, 
while liberals have not accomplished their residualist vision and have maintained a quite 
generous welfare regime, the growing deficit pushed the Social Democrats to introduce some 
cost-reducing measures. There is a paradox in the fiscal reform proposal of 2003 in that it is the 
left-centre government that is launching the measures that may cut back the living standard of 
the lower classes. The rationale behind this is that the economic problems that could appear if the 17 
deficit budgeting were to continue would afflict the lower classes much more seriously (Concept 
of the Reform, 2003).
7 
 
On the one hand, the long-term stagnation of the social reform process has resulted from the 
long-term political stalemate and from the fear of paying for the reform through a loss of support 
from the electorate if the reforms are pushed too vehemently.
8 On the other hand, the reason 
could be that there is a tacit agreement with the system, which works despite its problems and 
gives a moderate level of satisfaction to vulnerable groups like pensioners (keeping their benefits 
on still a decent level), long-term unemployed (providing them with welfare benefits or 
advantageous early retirement) and patients (including the possibility of misusing sick-leave 
status to avoid work and job troubles).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
7 However, recent events in early 2004 reveal great dissatisfaction with the reforms within CSSD. The proponents of 
reform are blamed for decreasing voter preferences and they are required to reduce especially price effect of 
changing VAT for food and children goods.  
8 The “opposition treaty” (Pact on the Creation of a Stable Political Environment) was concluded between the Civic 
Democratic Party (ODS) and the Social Democrats (CSSD) after the 1998 elections. In it, ODS endorsed the 
minority CSSD government and promised not to revoke it. Since 2002, the coalition of CSSD, Christian Democrats 
and Freedom Union has possessed only 101 seats in the 200-member Parliament. 18 
 
 
Table 3 Indicators of the objective and subjective well-being of households by economic 
status (%) 
 
 Fully 
active 
Fully 
inactive 
Partially 
active 
Fully 
pensio-
ner 
Total 
Percent households  50.2  15.1  16.0  18.6  100.0 
Relative equivalent income   120.5  74.9  86.6  76.5  100.0 
Variation coefficient of income  0.64  0.54  0.53  0.29  0.64 
Entitled to social assistance  1.5 15.7  7.3  0.1  4.3 
Poverty risk by EU criteria  4.1  25.3  15.2  1.8  8.7 
Having serious financial troubles  12.1  28.6  20.5  9.8  15.5 
Housing costs are a serious burden  32.6  51.0  45.8  29.4  36.9 
Cannot afford holidays away  37.1  72.2  55.0  73.3  52.2 
Source: Social Situation of Households, 2001. 
 
Classification of households by type introduced by the OECD: 
Fully active – two or more active adults 
Partially inactive – only one of two or two of three adults up to 65 years of age is/are active  
Fully inactive – no adult up to 65 years of age is active  
Fully pensioner – only persons 65 years and over are included  
 
Indicators: 
Relative equivalent income: income per equivalent unit which is computed so that the first 
adult=1.0, children up to 13 years of age = 0.5 and other children and adults=0.7.  
Entitled to social assistance: percentage of persons living in households whose income is lower 
than the legal living minimum.  
Poverty risk by EU criteria: percentage of persons with net income below 60% median income 
per equivalent unit (as in Table 2). 
Having serious financial troubles: first category of six on reported financial troubles. 
Housing costs are a serious burden: first category of four on reported burden with housing costs. 
Cannot afford holidays outside: percent households reporting they cannot afford one-week 
holidays away from home.  
 
Table 3 provides some evidence of such an agreement. While “objective” indicators measuring 
income level and the poverty rate or risk among various household types return substantial 
differences, “subjective” indicators of the perception of financial troubles show lesser 
differences, particularly between the fully non-active and partially active households. Statistical 
indicators do not cover the informal economy and other alternative strategies, including misuse 
of the system, which help households to cope with problems. What acts as a welfare trap from 
the institutional point of view, serves as a welcome strategy from the family point of view. With 
regard to the health system, satisfaction is quite high, as Table 5 (further below) demonstrates. 19 
 
Of significance for the peace that currently reigns over the social landscape is that even the trade 
unions, which were so active and vocal during the first pension and benefit reforms, are hardly to 
be heard. Only lastly, CMKOS questioned measures aimed at reducing the frequent abuse of 
sickness benefits and at lowering taxes within the reform package of public finance. According 
to a study by the World Economic Forum and Harvard University (quoted in the daily press), the 
Czech trade unions rank tenth in the world with regard to their welcoming attitude towards 
employers.
9 It seems as though the social field has already been divided up among invisible 
claimants and nobody wants to risk taking a step into the unknown.  
 
 
4. Czech social system – advancing or stagnating? 
 
In the early 1990s, the liberal rhetoric transferred from “Washington institutions” required a 
reduction of the presumably too generous social spending. According to Jeffrey Sachs (1991), 
the post-communist countries in Eastern Europe had the highest welfare budgets in the world 
(between 15 and 30 percent of GDP), especially in comparison with East Asian countries at 
similar income levels (which spent between 5 and 10 percent of GDP on social protection). 
Instead of cutting the burden, CEE countries turned back to the left-wing parties as instruments 
for undoing the new market economy and maintaining their usual living standard: “Left-wing 
parties are winning the elections ... because they are seen by the organized recipients of state 
largesse as the parties most likely to maintain or increase the entitlements of the social welfare 
state” (Sachs, 1995:1-2). 
 
In their polemical assessment of past left-turns, two Polish economists state that “the frequent 
elections and negative campaigns, the derailment of the economic policy, and the absence of 
right-wing parties from the Parliament since 1993, all have their immediate origin in the unduly 
cruel reforms. It was not careless social policy that led to the expenditures explosion. Instead, it 
was the unforeseen consequences of the overall economic policy and, in particular, of the 
                                                           
9 One of the reasons reported is the fact that trade union bosses are often members of supervisory boards as 
representatives of employees. Unlike the practice in Western Europe, they have full discretion regarding the 
disposition of their huge rewards, mostly keeping them for themselves (Daily MF DNES 9th December, 2003).  20 
 
 
stabilization program sponsored by the IMF and vigorously recommended by Professor Sachs” 
(Kabaj and Kowalik, 1995:7). Similarly, Zsuzsa Ferge blamed a “combined, liberal and 
conservative attack against universal benefits ... based not only on budgetary constraints but also 
on false historical parallels, and political demagogy” (Ferge, 1994:19). 
 
Indeed, CEE governments were rather reluctant to pursue the kinds of radical social reforms 
recommended by Washington liberals at the time. In spite of this, important changes have 
occurred in these countries. Special measures were energetically taken for the protection of the 
labour market, these having been provoked by imminent problems of huge unemployment, rising 
unemployment and especially the long-term unemployment pool. In the welfare system, a shift 
occurred from state universal benefits to compulsory insurance, complementing mandatory 
social insurance with private schemes, lowering the standards of entitled public provisions, 
expanding targeted social assistance, introducing or increasing fees and advancing the off-budget 
financing of social protection (Ferge, 1994; Götting, 1995).  
 
In the Czech Republic, the original liberal design of social reform was also considerably reduced, 
but still it appeared as the leading country in welfare reforms in the mid-1990s. Mitchell 
Orenstein (1994:193) contrasts the “strong package of social policies”, expressing a strategy for 
smooth transition in the Czech Republic, with Poland’s “fragmented safety net”, exhibiting a 
lack of policy direction, premature decentralisation and the misallocation of resources. Miroslav 
Ksiezopolski (1993:192-193) also criticised the lack of any coherent vision of social policy in 
Poland and considered a growing loss of control in the social sphere as untenable. Similarly, 
Vladimir Rys (1995:207) was highly sceptical of the social reform in Hungary and Poland “due 
to economic and political imperatives”. Simultaneously, he has also drawn attention to a 
“disparity of elements” in the Czech system, which will hinder the scheme to function 
coherently. 
 
The Central-East European scene looks different in the early 2000s, especially in the area of 
pension reform. While in Poland, Hungary and Slovakia, systemic reforms have been introduced, 
the governmental proposal in the Czech Republic has limited itself to parametric adjustments 
only (OECD, 2003). The country is lagging behind in other fields also, trailing, for example, 21 
Slovakia, where radical reforms have been started in the tax system, employment incentives and 
social benefits. Instead, some minor changes have been proposed in the Czech Republic – 
retirement age shall be further increased (to 65 years), the conditions for early retirement made 
stricter, social benefits made more rigorously means-tested, sickness benefits reduced, etc. 
Simultaneously, the minimum wage is regularly raised to broaden the gap between low wages 
and welfare benefits. 
 
Nevertheless, even sectors abundant with problems can return good results - as the general health 
status of the Czech population shows: the life expectancy considerably increased (by 3 years for 
males and 2.6 years for females) during the 1990s; infant mortality fell by 50 percent since 1990, 
reaching the level of the most developed EU countries (Czech Republic, 2000). In fact, it was not 
only the better accessibility of the advanced technologies and pharma-products in health care, but 
also the general improvement of the environment and lifestyle, especially nutrition (far more 
fruit and vegetables are being consumed after 1989, instead of the meat and cereals with which 
the communists fed the nation). 
 
Table 4 Level of confidence in various public systems and bodies (scale 0-100) 
 
Level of confidence in  Czech 
Repu-
blic 
Slova-
kia 
Poland Austria Ger-
many 
Swe-
den 
Education  system    55 62 71 71 59 58 
Social  security  system  43 41 43 59 46 49 
Health  care  system  48 49 55 70 53 62 
Parliament  28 42 40 45 41 50 
Public  services    37 42 40 47 42 48 
Justice  system  36 39 46 59 52 54 
Trade  unions    32 43 40 38 42 45 
Source: European Values Study, 1999. 
The scale is constructed in such a way that the answer “very high”=100, “considerable”=66, “not 
very high”=33 and “not at all”=0. 
 
Owing to the absence of qualitative criteria for social systems (unlike the quantitative 
measurements of financial costs), there is little possibility of evaluating national systems as more 
or less progressive or – even – efficient in the long term. However, we can quite easily observe 
the level of people’s satisfaction with individual components of the welfare regime (Table 4). A 22 
 
 
comparison of the confidence in social security and health care shows that both evoke more 
confidence in Austria, Germany and Sweden than in the CEE countries. In the Czech Republic, 
one-third of people are confident in the social system and over 40 percent in health care – this is 
more than in the Balkan countries but less than in Poland and the Baltic countries. 
 
Table 5 Evaluation of performance efficiency of various public areas (%) 
 
Area Very 
good 
Quite 
good 
Rather 
bad 
Very bad  Does 
not 
know 
Total 
Access to housing   0.8  5.6  38.6  52.2  2.8  100.0 
Family support  0.5  9.2  47.9  38.1  4.4  100.0 
Old-age security  0.8  16.4  43.7  30.5  8.6  100.0 
Access to employment  0.6  22.0  47.3  26.8  3.3  100.0 
Access to education   15.3  63.7  11.5  2.5  6.5  100.0 
Health care   7.3  61.1  23.2  6.0  2.4  100.0 
Source: CVVM Survey, May 2003. 
Items are ranked from the worst to the best evaluation. 
 
In a comparison of various areas of “public care”, the area considered worst is that of access to 
housing, with a minimum dispersion among the population (Table 5). Also, family support is 
considered very negatively, for young couples in particular. Indeed, the fertility rate in the Czech 
Republic ranks among the lowest in Europe. Currently, universal child allowances (provided to 
about 85 percent families since the mid-1990s reform) and the possibility of earning extra 
income alongside the parental benefits have been proposed – both making only a minimum 
contribution. While health care is evaluated as the best, the evaluation is the most dispersed 
among the population, particularly by age.  
 
With reference to adjustment, there is a level of concrete tasks which were most recently 
formulated in the Joint Memorandum on Social Inclusion (JIM) of the Czech Republic (Joint, 
2003).
10 The Czech government and the European Commission agreed that it is necessary:  
•  to create a new system for providing financial assistance in situations of material need with a 
view to eliminating long-term dependence on social allowances and linking the receipt of 
benefits more closely to activation measures to assist people in obtaining employment; 23 
•  to further expand preventive and support measures so as to enhance employability as a means 
of preventing long-term unemployment and to expand and enlarge social and training 
programmes for those from especially disadvantaged social and cultural environments; 
•  to modernise the contents of education with respect to the needs of general personal 
development (with special emphasis on functional literacy) and to the needs of the labour 
market and to put in place a comprehensive system of lifelong learning; 
•  to interconnect health and social care mainly at community level by creating so-called 
integrated community care and to complete and introduce standards which will ensure 
guaranteed minimum care from a qualitative and quantitative point of view; 
•  to enhance a properly functioning housing market and to introduce a specialised sector of 
social housing; 
•  to improve transport accessibility especially in disadvantaged regions. 
 
Apparently, there are a lot of additional policies which must be asserted to strengthen individual 
responsibility, create more incentives for people to retain in the active labour force and adjust to 
new requirements of mobility and flexibility. One has to admit most of these tasks are difficult to 
fulfil – problems of housing market, re-orientation of education, inclusion of disadvantaged 
groups, as well as public/private mix in pension system and social care are on the governmental 
table since 1990, but little progress was made. In fact, any effort of a thorough reform evaporates 
soon in everyday political life.  
 
However, the “European Social Model” means much more than individual policies related to 
labour market and social protection. As Aust, Leitner and Lessenich (2000:6) demonstrate, it 
“can be defined as a complex configuration of a specific institutional order of the polity, the 
economy, and the society, which is mainly characterized by the central role of politics and public 
interventionism”. The establishment of such a model (moreover fed by economic growth) 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
10 The tasks identified in the Joint Memorandum on Social Inclusion constitute a framework for the drafting of the 
Czech Republic’s first National Action Plan on Social Inclusion. It thus follows National Action Plans of the EU 
member states, set at Nice in December 2000 (Joint, 2002). 24 
 
 
represents a historical process. We must recall that the retrenchment of the welfare state in 
Western countries was also only minor, despite the huge effort invested.
11  
 
Although the post-communist welfare state cannot be fairly titled a “frozen edifice”, like in the 
Western countries (Esping-Andersen, 1996:2), social reform is certainly a protracted process 
with a “remarkable degree of durability” (Götting, 1995:22). The current lethargy of the Czech 
welfare system in particular corresponds to this picture. However, such stagnation is apparently 
acceptable to both the politicians (who mask it in reformist rhetoric) and the population (which 
learned to master taking advantage of the generous welfare state) and is thus sustainable in the 
long run.   
 
 
                                                           
11 Paul Pierson (1995) has shown the strength of political forces, rooted in democratic institutions, which hamper 
any radical reduction in expenditures, and the high level of electorate costs associated with retrenchment activities. 25 
References: 
 
Andries, M. (1996) The Politics of Targeting: the Belgian Case. Journal of European Social 
Policy Vol. 6, pp. 209-224. 
Aust, A., Leitner, S. and Lessenich, S. (2000) Desperately Seeking: the European Social Model. 
Paper presented on the ISA/RC19 session, Tillburg. 
Barr, N. ed. (1994) Labor Markets and Social Policy in Central and Eastern Europe. The 
Transition and Beyond. Oxford University Press.  
Berger, P.L. (1986) The Capitalist Revolution. Fifty Propositions about Prosperity, Equality and 
Liberty. New York: Basic Books. 
Castle-Kanerova, M. (1992) Social Policy in Czechoslovakia, In: Deacon, B. (ed.) The New 
Eastern Europe. London: Sage. 
Concept of the reform of public finance. Internal document of the Government of the Czech 
Republic, June 2003. 
Cook, L.J. Orenstein, M.A. and Rueschemeyer, M. (1999) Left Parties and Social Policy in 
Postcommunist Europe. Boulder, CO and Oxford: Westview Press.  
Czech Republic (2000) Environment and Quality of Life after Ten Years of Transition. Prague: 
Environment Center of Charles University.  
De Deken, J.J. (1992) Social Policy and Politics of Solidarity. Are There Any Prospects for 
Social Democracy in East-Central Europe? Some Reflections with Particular Reference to 
Czechoslovakia. In: Waller, M., Coppieters, B. and Deschouwer, K. eds., Social Democracy in 
East-Central Europe. London: Frank Cass.  
De Deken, J. J. (1995) The Politics of Solidarity and the Structuration of Social Policy Regimes 
in Postwar Europe – The Development of Housing Policies in Belgium, Czechoslovakia and 
Sweden. Doctoral thesis at European University Institute, Florence. 
Easterly, W. (2000) The Middle Class Consensus and Economic Development. The World Bank 
Working Papers No. 2346. 
Elster, J., Offe, C. and Preuss, U.K. (1998) Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies. 
Rebuilding the Ship at Sea. Cambridge University Press. 
Esping-Andersen, G. (1996) After the Golden Age? Welfare State Dilemmas in a Global 
Economy, In: Esping-Andersen, G. (ed.), Welfare States in Transition. National Adaptations in 
Global Economies. London: Sage. 
Esping-Andersen, G. (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Etzioni, A. (1988) The Moral Dimension. Toward A New Economics. New York: The Free Press. 
Ferge, Z. (1994) The Reform of Social Policy in the Post-totalitarian Countries. Comments on 
the Various Reform Strategies. Paper prepared for the ISSA 1994 Yearbook. 
Goodin, R.E. and Le Grand, J. (1987) Not Only the Poor. London: George Allen & Unwin. 
Götting, U. (1998) Transformation der Wohlfahrtstaaten in Mittel- und Osteuropa. Eine 
Zwischenbilanz. Opladen: Leske & Budrich.  
Joint Report (2002) on Social Inclusion. Brussels: The European Commission. 
Joint (2003) Memorandum on Social Inclusion. The Ministry of Labour of the Czech Republic 
and Social Affairs and the European Commission. 
Kabaj, M. and Kowalik, T. (1995) Who Is Responsible for Postcommunist Successes in Eastern 
Europe? Transition, Vol. 6, No. 6. 
Kornai, J. (1995) Highways and Byways. Studies in Reform and Post-Communist Transition. 
Cambridge and London: The MIT Press.  DAVIDSON INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES - Most Recent Papers
The entire Working Paper Series may be downloaded free of charge at: www.wdi.bus.umich.edu 
CURRENT AS OF 2/10/04 
Publication Authors  Date 
No. 651: Czech Social Reform/Non-reform: Routes, Actors and 
Problems 
Jiri Vecernik  Feb. 2004 
No. 650: Financial Integration, Exchange Rate Regimes in CEECs, 
and Joining the EMU: Just Do It... 
Maurel Mathilde  Feb. 2004 
No. 649: Corporate Investments, Liquidity and Bank Financing: 
Empirical Evidence from an Emerging Market 
Arun Khanna  Feb. 2004 
No. 648: Financial Constraints in Investment – Foreign Versus 
Domestic Firms.  Panel Data Results From Estonia, 1995-1999. 
Tomasz Mickiewicz, Kate Bishop 
and Urmas Varblane 
Feb. 2004 
No. 647: Legal Minimum Wages and the Wages of Formal and Informal 
Sector Workers in Costa Rica 
T. H. Gindling and Katherine 
Terrell
Feb. 2004 
No. 646: Employment Expectations and Gross Flows by Type of Work 
Contract 
Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes and 
Miguel Á. Malo 
Jan. 2004 
No. 645: Transition on the Shop Floor - The Restructuring of a Weaving 
Mill, Hungary 1988-97 
János KöllĘ Jan.  2004 
No. 644: Fighting “Low Equilibria” by Doubling the Minimum Wage ? 
Hungary’s Experiment 
Gábor Kertei and János KöllĘ Jan.  2004 
No. 643: Mind the Break! Accounting for Changing Patterns of Growth 
during Transition 
Jan Fidrmuc and Ariane Tichit  Jan. 2004 
No. 642: The Monetary Approach to Exchange Rates in the CEECs  Jesús Crespo-Cuaresma, Jarko 
Fidrmuc and Ronald MacDonald 
Jan. 2004 
No. 641: Community Norms and Organizational Practices: The 
Legitimization of Wage Arrears in Russia, 1992-1999 
John S. Earle, Andrew Spicer and 
Klara Sabirianova Peter 
Jan. 2004 
No. 640: Trust in Transition: Cross Country and Firm Evidence  Martin Raiser, Alan Rousso, and 
Franklin Steves 
Jan. 2004 
No. 639: What Makes Small Firms Grow? Finance, Human Capital, 
Technical Assistance, and the Business Environment in Romania 
J. David Brown, John S. Earle 
and Dana Lup 
Jan. 2004 
No. 638: The Politics of Economic Reform in Thailand: Crisis and 
Compromise 
Allen Hicken  Jan. 2004 
No. 637: How Much Restructuring did the Transition Countries 
Experience?  Evidence from Quality of their Exports 
Yener Kandogan Jan.  2004 
No. 636: Estimating the Size and Growth of Unrecorded Economic 
Activity in Transition Countries: A Re-Evaluation of Eclectric 
Consumption Method Estimates and their Implications 
Edgar L. Feige and Ivana Urban  Dec. 2003 
No. 635: Measuring the Value Added by Money  Vlad Ivanenko  Nov. 2003 
No. 634: Sensitivity of the Exporting Economy on the External Shocks: 
Evidence from Slovene Firms 
Janez Prašnikar, Velimir Bole, 
Aleš Ahcan and Matjaž Koman 
Nov. 2003 
No. 633: Reputation Flows: Contractual Disputes and the Channels for 
Inter-firm Communication 
William Pyle  Nov. 2003 
No. 632: The Politics of Development Policy and Development Policy 
Reform in New Order Indonesia 
Michael T. Rock  Nov. 2003 
No. 631: The Reorientation of Transition Countries’ Exports: 
Changes in Quantity, Quality and Variety 
Yener Kandogan Nov.  2003 
No. 630: Inequality of Outcomes and Inequality of Opportunities in 
Brazil
François Bourguignon, Francisco 
H.G. Ferreira and Marta 
Menéndez
Nov. 2003 
No. 629: Job Search Behavior of Unemployed in Russia  Natalia Smirnova  Nov. 2003 
No. 628: How has Economic Restructuring Affected China’s Urban 
Workers? 
John Giles, Albert Park, Feng Cai  Oct. 2003 
No. 627: The Life Cycle of Government Ownership  Jiahua Che  Oct. 2003 
No. 626: Blocked Transition And Post-Socialist Transformation: Siberia 
in the Nineties 
Silvano Bolcic   Oct. 2003 